Of course, I must disagree with Nielsens position that decision makes discourse practical. The principle is formed because the intellect, assuming the office of active principle, accepts the requirements of that role, and demands of itself that in directing action it must really direct. 20. [4] A position Aquinas develops in q. [39] E.g., Schuster, op. ODonoghue must read quae as if it refers to primum principium, whereas it can only refer to rationem boni. The primum principium is identical with the first precept mentioned in the next line of text, while the ratio boni is not a principle of practical reason but a quasi definition of good, and as such a principle of understanding. Previously, however, he had given the principle in the formulation: Good is to be done and evil avoided. Ibid. In the second paragraph of the response Aquinas clarifies the meaning of self-evident. His purpose is not to postulate a peculiar meaning for self-evident in terms of which the basic precepts of natural law might be self-evident although no one in fact knew them. After observing these two respects in which the mistaken interpretation unduly restricts the scope of the first principle of practical reason, we may note also that this principle as Aquinas understands it is not merely a principle of imperative judgments. For the notion of judgment forming choice see, For a comparison between judgments of prudence and those of conscience see my paper, , Even those interpreters who usually can be trusted tend to fall into the mistake of considering the first principle of practical reason as if it were fundamentally theoretical. But Aquinas does not describe natural law as eternal law passively received in man; he describes it rather as a participation in the eternal law. Practical reason does not have its truth by conforming to what it knows, for what practical reason knows does not have the being and the definiteness it would need to be a standard for intelligence. Answer: The master principle of natural law, wrote Aquinas, was that "good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided." Aquinas stated that reason reveals particular natural laws that are good for humans such as self-preservation, marriage and family, and the desire to know God. But does not Aquinas imagine the subject as if it were a container full of units of meaning, each unit a predicate? But in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. Before unpacking this, it is worth clarifying something about what "law" means. at II.8.4. This interpretation simply ignores the important role we have seen Aquinas assign the inclinations in the formation of natural law. that the precept of charity is self-evident to human reason, either by nature or by faith, since a. knowledge of God sufficient to form the natural law precept of charity can come from either natural knowledge or divine revelation. 2) Since the mistaken interpretation restricts the meaning of good and evil in the first principle to the value of moral actions, the meaning of these key terms must be clarified in the light of Aquinass theory of final causality. [64] Every participation is really distinct from that in which it participatesa principle evidently applicable in this case, for the eternal law is God while the law of nature is a set of precepts. Sertillanges also tries to understand the principle as if it were a theoretical truth equivalent to an identity statement. The Literary Theory Handbook introduces students to the history and scope of literary theory, showing them how to perform literary analysis, and providing a greater understanding of the historical contexts for different theories.. A new edition of this highly successful text, which includes updated and refined chapters, and new sections on contemporary theories [These pertain uniquely to the rational faculty.] E-Book Overview. Thus we see that final causality underlies Aquinass conception of what law is. 4. Obviously no one could ask it who did not hold that natural law consists of precepts, and even those who took this position would not ask about the unity or multiplicity of precepts unless they saw some significance in responding one way or the other. The latter are principles of demonstration in systematic sciences such as geometry. Later, in treating the Old Law, Aquinas maintains that all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature, and then he proceeds to distinguish those moral precepts which carry the obligation of strict precept from those which convey only the warning of counsel. [67] Moreover, the basic principle of desire, natural inclination in the appetitive part of the soul, is consequent upon prior apprehension, natural knowledge. Ought requires no special act legitimatizing it; ought rules its own domain by its own authority, an authority legitimate as that of any is. c. God is to be praised, and Satan is to be condemned. Of course, we can be conditioned to enjoy perverse forms of indulgence, but we could not be conditioned if we did not have, not only at the beginning but also as an underlying constant throughout the entire learning process, an inclination toward pleasure. Any other precept will add to this first one; other precepts determine precisely what die direction is and what the starting point must be if that direction is to be followed out. Here Aquinas indicates how the complexity of human nature gives rise to a multiplicity of inclinations, and these to a multiplicity of precepts. Second, there is in man an inclination to certain more restricted goods based on the aspect of his nature which he has in common with other animals. It is necessary for the active principle to be oriented toward that something or other, whatever it is, if it is going to be brought about. [12] That Aquinas did not have this in mind appears at the beginning of the third paragraph, where he begins to determine the priorities among those things which fall within the grasp of everyone. No doubt there are some precepts not everyone knows although they are objectively self-evidentfor instance, precepts concerning the relation of man to God: God should be loved above all, and: God should be obeyed before all. All rights reserved. The objective dimension of the reality of beings that we know in knowing this principle is simply the definiteness that is involved in their very objectivity, a definiteness that makes a demand on the intellect knowing them, the very least demandto think consistently of them.[16]. The natural law is a participation in the wisdom and goodness of God by the human person, formed in the image of the Creator. Is the condition of having everything in its proper place in one's character and conduct, including personally possessing all the three other classic virtues in proper measure. It is this later resolution that I am supposing here. The first principle of morally good action is the principle of all human action, but bad action fulfills the requirement of the first principle less perfectly than good action does. Obligation is a strictly derivative concept, with its origin in ends and the requirements set by ends. The preservation of human life is certainly a human good. But the first principle all the while exercises its unobtrusive control, for it drives the mind on toward judgment, never permitting it to settle into inconsistent muddle. 1, ad 9. See also Van Overbeke, op. 2 Although verbally this formula is only slightly different from that of the com-mand, Do good and avoid evil, I shall try to show that the two formulae differ considerably in meaning and that they belong in different theoretical contexts. Good is not merely a generic expression for whatever anyone may happen to want,[50] for if this were the case there would not be a single first principle but as many first principles as there are basic commitments, and each first principle would provide the major premise for a different system of rules. To recognize this distinction is not to deny that law can be expressed in imperative form. Only truths of reason are supposed to be necessary, but their necessity is attributed to meaning which is thought of as a quality inherent in ideas in the mind. The pursuit of the good which is the end is primary; the doing of the good which is the means is subordinate. Just as the principle of contradiction expresses the definiteness which is the first condition of the objectivity of things and the consistency which is the first condition of theoretical reasons conformity to reality, so the first principle of practical reason expresses the imposition of tendency, which is the first condition of reasons objectification of itself, and directedness or intentionality, which is the first condition for conformity to mind on the part of works and ends. For example, both subject and predicate of the proposition, But in this discussion I have been using the word intelligibility (, It is not merely the meaning with which a word is used, for someone may use a word, such as rust, and use it correctly, without understanding all that is included in its intelligibility. Although Bourke is right in noticing that Nielsens difficulties partly arise from his positivism, I think Bourke is mistaken in supposing that a more adequate metaphysics could bridge the gap between theory and practice. Thus he comes to the study of natural law in question 94. The primary precepts of practical reason, he says, concern the things-to-be-done that practical reason naturally grasps as human goods, and the things-to-be-avoided that are opposed to those goods. [26] He remarks that the habit of these ends is synderesis, which is the habit of the principles of the natural law. cit. It also is a mistake to suppose that the primary principle is equivalent to the precept, Reason should be followed, as Lottin seems to suggest. 3, d. 33, q. done pursued and evil avoided St. Thomas Aquinas - Natural laws are good FIRST SCHOOL OF CONSCIENCE for humans such as self-preservation, marriage, Self-criticism - Judge things to our own family, and desire to know God advantage St. Thomas Aquinas - Bad for humans; Adultery, suicide, lying SECOND SCHOOL OF CONSCIENCE The formula. Consequently, when Aquinas wishes to indicate strict obligation he often uses a special mode of expression to make this idea explicit. [75] S.T. Aquinas is suggesting that we all have the innate instinct to do good and avoid . 2 .Aquinas wrote that "good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided." Aquinas stated that reason reveals particular natural laws that are good for humans such as self-preservation, marriage and family, and the desire to know God. These tendencies are not natural law; the tendencies indicate possible actions, and hence they provide reason with the point of departure it requires in order to propose ends. Aquinas knew this, and his theory of natural law takes it for granted. 1-2, q. For this reason, too, the natural inclinations are not emphasized by Suarez as they are by Aquinas. This therefore is the principle of law: that good must be done and evil avoided. objects of knowledge, unknown but waiting in hiding, fully formed and ready for discovery. Aquinas mentions this point in at least two places. Practical reason, therefore, presupposes good. One is to suppose that it means anthropomorphism, a view at home both in the primitive mind and in idealistic metaphysics. The imperative not only provides rational direction for action, but it also contains motive force derived from an antecedent act of the will bearing upon the object of the action. Before intelligence enters, man acts by sense spontaneity and learns by sense experience. Many other authors could be cited: e.g., Stevens. In prescribing we must direct, and we cannot reasonably avoid carrying out in reality the intelligibility which reason has conceived. . 5, for the notion of first principles as instruments which the agent intellect employs in making what follows actually intelligible. [16] In libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. In the article next after the one commented upon above, Aquinas asks whether the acts of all the virtues are of the law of nature. [79] Only one among the natural inclinations of man is that based on his rational nature to act according to rational direction. In accordance with this inclination, those things are said to be of natural law which nature teaches all animals, among which are the union of male and female, the raising of children, and the like. The first article raises the issue: Whether natural law is a habit. Aquinas holds that natural law consists of precepts of reason, which are analogous to propositions of theoretical knowledge. They ignore the peculiar character of practical truth and they employ an inadequate notion of self-evidence. A first principle of practical reason that prescribes only the basic condition necessary for human action establishes an order of such flexibility that it can include not only the goods to which man is disposed by nature but even the good to which human nature is capable of being raised only by the aid of divine grace. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men. Philosophers have constructed their systems of ethics weighted in favor of one or another good precisely for this reason. 94, a. Lottin informs us that already with Stephen of Tournai, around 1160, there is a definition of natural law as an innate principle for doing good and avoiding evil. Thus the status Aquinas attributes to the first principle of practical reason is not without significance. 91. d. Act according to the precepts of the state, and never against. B. Schuster, S.J., Von den ethischen Prinzipien: Eine Thomasstudie zu S. In fact, it refers primarily to the end which is not limited to moral value. When he realized that the visitor bore ill will, he tracked the aura." "He caught up with it on White Water Island, but then the evil aura disappeared. The principle in action is the rule of action; therefore, reason is the rule of action. 2, c. The translation is my own; the paragraphing is added. 94, a. The first principle of the natural law has often been translated from the original Latin as "Do good, avoid evil.". Purpose in view, then, is a real aspect of the dynamic reality of practical reason, and a necessary condition of reasons being practical. [80] As a particular norm, the injunction to follow reason has specific consequences for right action. The other misunderstanding is common to mathematically minded rationalists, who project the timelessness and changelessness of formal system onto reality, and to empiricists, who react to rationalism without criticizing its fundamental assumptions. It is important, however, to see the precise manner in which the principle. The third argument for the position that natural law has only one precept is drawn from the premises that human reason is one and that law belongs to reason. It enters our practical knowledge explicitly if not distinctly, and it has the status of a self-evident principle of reason just as truly as do the precepts enjoining self-preservation and other natural goods. If some practical principle is hypothetical because there is an alternative to it, only a practical principle (and ultimately a nonhypothetical practical principle) can foreclose the rational alternative. We have not loved you with our whole heart; we have not loved our neighbors as ourselves. at II.5.12. 57, aa. Before intelligence enters, man acts by sense spontaneity and learns by sense experience. On the one hand, the causality of God is not a principle evident to us. [78] Stevens, op. In the treatise on the Old Law, for example, Aquinas takes up the question whether this law contains only a single precept. 4) Since according to the mistaken interpretation natural law is a set of imperatives, it is important to see why the first principle is not primarily an imperative, although it is a genuine precept. This transcendence of the goodness of the end over the goodness of moral action has its ultimate metaphysical foundation in this, that the end of each creatures action can be an end for it only by being a participation in divine goodness. (S. th. But binding is characteristic of law; therefore, law pertains to reason. 5. [19] S.T. The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the, [Grisez, Germain. On the one hand, a principle is not Self-evident if it can be derived from some prior principle, which provides a foundation for it. This principle, as Aquinas states it, is: Aquinass statement of the first principle of practical reason occurs in, Question 94 is divided into six articles, each of which presents a position on a single issue concerning the law of nature. Naturalism frequently has explained away evildoing, just as some psychological and sociological theories based on determinism now do. as Aquinas states it, is: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. referring to pursuit subordinates it to the avoidance of evil: Perhaps Suarezs most personal and most characteristic formulation of the primary precept is given where he discusses the scope of natural law. As to the end, Suarez completely separates the notion of it from the notion of law. Thus Lottin makes the precept appear as much as possible like a theoretical statement expressing a peculiar aspect of the goodnamely, that it is the sort of thing that demands doing. Perhaps even more surprising is another respect in which the first practical principle as Aquinas sees it has a broader scope than is usually realized. 2, ad 2. [18], Now if practical reason is the mind functioning as a principle of action, it is subject to all the conditions necessary for every active principle. supra note 3, at 79. The distinction between these two modes of practical discourse often is ignored, and so it may seem that to deny imperative force to the primary precept is to remove it from practical discourse altogether and to transform it into a merely theoretical principle. It is not merely the meaning with which a word is used, for someone may use a word, such as rust, and use it correctly, without understanding all that is included in its intelligibility. Hence it is understandable that the denial of the status of premise to the first practical principle should lead to the supposition that it is a pure forma denial to it of any status as an object of self-conscious knowledge. Because such principles are not equally applicable to all contents of experience, even though they can be falsified by none, we can at least imagine them not to be true. And of course it is much more opposed to wrong actions. Ibid. Our personalities are largely shaped by acculturation in our particular society, but society would never affect us if we had no basic aptitude for living with others. Lottin, for example, balances his notion that we first assent to the primary principle as to a theoretical truth with the notion that we finally assent to it with a consent of the will. All other precepts of natural law rest upon this. To such criticism it is no answer to argue that empiricism makes an unnatural cleavage between facts and values. To function as principles, their status as underivables must be recognized, and this recognition depends upon a sufficient understanding of their terms, i.e., of the intelligibilities signified by those terms. note 40), by a full and careful comparison of Aquinass and Suarezs theories of natural law, clarifies the essential point very well, without suggesting that natural law is human legislation, as ODonoghue seems to think. The mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory suggests that law is essentially a curb upon action. 94, a. 4, c. [27] See Lottin, op. 2, c; Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, bk. Aquinas identified the following "Universal Human Values": Human Life, Health, Procreation, Wealth, Welfare of Children and Knowledge. Do good, together with Such an action is good, leads deductively to Do that action. If the first principle actually did function in this manner, all other precepts would be conclusions derived from it. This is a directive for action . This question hasn't been solved yet Ask an expert True or False Utilitarianism is an inadequate ethical theory partly because it overly restricts natural inclination, for it assumes that mans sole determinate inclination is in regard to pleasure and pain. But over and above this objection, he insists that normative discourse, insofar as it is practical, simply cannot be derived from a mere consideration of facts. [30] Ibid. His position is: we are capable of thinking for ourselves in the practical domain because we naturally form a set of principles that make possible all of our actions. 91, a. cit. Mans ability to choose his ultimate end has its metaphysical ground in the spiritual nature of man himself, on the one hand, and in the transcendent aspect that every end, as a participation in divine goodness, necessarily includes, on the other. DO GOOD AND AVOID EVIL 1. 4, lect. Being is the basic intelligibility; it represents our first discovery about anything we are to knowthat it is something to be known. 1, sed contra, ad 3; q. This is, one might say, a principle of intelligibility of action (cf. One is to suppose that it means anthropomorphism, a view at home both in the primitive mind and in idealistic metaphysics. De legibus, II.8.2. cit. [15] On ratio see Andre Haven, S.J., LIntentionnel selon Saint Thomas (2nd ed., Bruges, Bruxelles, Paris, 1954), 175194. Among his formulations are: That which is to be done is to be done, and: The good is an end worth pursuing.. 1, a. These goods are not primarily works that are to be done. For Aquinas, practical reason not only has a peculiar subject matter, but it is related to its subject matter in a peculiar way, for practical reason introduces the order it knows, while theoretical reason adopts the order it finds. However, a full and accessible presentation along these general lines may be found in, Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum., La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon S. Thomas,. The end is the first principle in matters of action; reason orders to the end; therefore, reason is the principle of action. supra note 3, at 16, n. 1. At the same time, the transcendence of the primary precept over all definite goods allows the conjunction of reason with freedom. 11; 1-2, q. Man cannot begin to act as man without law. at II.15.2) referring to pursuit subordinates it to the avoidance of evil: Evil is to be avoided and good is to be pursued. Perhaps Suarezs most personal and most characteristic formulation of the primary precept is given where he discusses the scope of natural law. T. 1-2, q. [58] S.T. And, in fact. To the first argument, based on the premises that law itself is a precept and that natural law is one, Aquinas answers that the many precepts of the natural law are unified in relation to the primary principle. Id. See. This point is of the greatest importance in Aquinass treatise on the end of man. Being is the basic intelligibility; it represents our first discovery about anything we are to knowthat it is, To say that all other principles are based on this principle does not mean that all other principles are derived from it by deduction. From Catechism of the Catholic Church (1789) Some rules apply in every case: - One may never do evil so that good may result from it; - the Golden Rule: "Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them."56 - charity always proceeds by way of respect for one's neighbor and his conscience: 2, d. 39, q. 3, c; q. Indeed, the addition of will to theoretical knowledge cannot make it practical. For example, man has a natural inclination to this, that he might know the truth concerning God, and to this, that he might live in society. According to St. Thomas, the very first principle of practical reasoning in general is: The good is to be done and pursued; the bad is to be avoided (S.t., 1-2, q. Hence I shall begin by emphasizing the practical character of the principle, and then I shall proceed to clarify its lack of imperative force. Avoiding Evil. Hedonism is _____. His response is that since precepts oblige, they are concerned with duties, and duties derive from the requirements of an end. This principle, as Aquinas states it, is: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. The first precept directs us to direct our action toward ends within human power, and even immoral action in part fulfills this precept, for even vicious men act for a human good while accepting the violation of more adequate human good. Nor does he merely insert another bin between the two, as Kant did when he invented the synthetic a priori. cit. Previously, however, he had given the principle in the formulation: Good is to be done and evil avoided., But there and in a later passage, where he actually mentions, he seems to be repeating received formulae. Verse Concepts. The kits jeopardize people's privacy, physical health, and financial well-being. (Op. Reproduced with permission of The American Journal of Jurisprudence (formerly Natural Law Forum). Odon Lottin, O.S.B., Le droit naturel chez Saint Thomas dAquin et ses prdcesseurs (2nd ed., Bruges, 1931), 79 mentions that the issue of the second article had been posed by Albert the Great (cf. Now in the sixth paragraph he is indicating the basis on which reason primarily prescribes as our natural inclinations suggest. For that which primarily falls within ones grasp is being, and the understanding of being is included in absolutely everything that anyone grasps. Hence an end for Aquinas has two inseparable aspectswhat is attained and the attainment of it. The failure to keep this distinction in mind can lead to chaos in normative ethics. Significant in these formulations are the that which (ce qui) and the double is, for these expressions mark the removal of gerundive force from the principal verb of the sentence. [50] A. G. Sertillanges, O.P., La philosophie morale de Saint Thomas dAquin (Paris, 1946), 109, seems to fall into this mistaken interpretation. The formula (Ibid. The basic principle is not related to the others as a premise, an efficient cause, but as a form which differentiates itself in its application to the different matters directed by practical reason. The first principle of practical reason thus gives us a way of interpreting experience; it provides an outlook in terms of which subsequent precepts will be formed, for it lays down the requirement that every precept must prescribe, just as the first principle of theoretical reason is an awareness that every assent posits. Thus to insure this fundamental point, it will be useful to examine the rest of the treatise on law in which the present issue arises. [3] For this reason the arguments, which Aquinas sets out at the beginning of the article in order to construct the issue he wants to resolve, do not refer to authorities, as the opening arguments of his articles usually do. Most people were silent. 1-2, q. cit. Moral action, and that upon which it immediately bears, can be directed to ulterior goods, and for this very reason moral action cannot be the absolutely ultimate end. In fact the principle of contradiction does not directly enter into arguments as a premise except in the case of arguments, In the fourth paragraph Aquinas states that, Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that practical knowledge, because it is prior to its object, is independent of experience. It is this later resolution that I am supposing here. In other words, the reason for the truth of the self-evident principle is what is directly signified by it, not any extrinsic cause. Consequently, that Aquinas does not consider the first principle of the natural law to be a premise from which the rest of it is deduced must have a special significance. But reason needs starting points. 6. mentions that the issue of the second article had been posed by Albert the Great (cf. In other words, in Suarezs mind Aquinas only meant to say of the inclinations that they are subject to natural law. The intellect is not theoretical by nature and practical only by education. These remarks may have misleading connotations for us, for we have been conditioned by several centuries of philosophy in which analytic truths (truths of reason) are opposed to synthetic truths (truths of fact). A good part of Thomas's output, in effect, aims at doing these three things, and this obviously justifies its broad use of philosophical argumentation. The mere fact of decision, or the mere fact of feeling one of the sentiments invoked by Hume, is no more a basis for ought than is any other is. Hume misses his own pointthat ought. For Aquinas, the Primary Precepts are based on the Synderesis Rule; in the words of Aquinas this is ' that good is to be done and evil avoided '. The Latin verb translated as "do" is the verb "facere," which can also be . p. but the question was not a commonplace. supra note 18, at 142150, provides a compact and accurate treatment of the true sense of knowledge by connaturality in Aquinas; however, he unfortunately concludes his discussion by suggesting that the alternative to such knowledge is theoretical.) The first practical principle is like a basic tool which is inseparable from the job in which the tool is used; it is the implement for making all the other tools to be used on the job, but none of them is equivalent to it, and so the basic tool permeates all the work done in that job. Container full of units of meaning, each unit a predicate do that action out in reality the which. Practical reason: a Commentary on the end, Suarez completely separates the notion of self-evidence characteristic of! Is being, and we can not reasonably avoid carrying out in reality the which... 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C ; Super libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, bk at the good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided time the! They are by Aquinas Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib in making what follows actually intelligible ones grasp is being, we. His response is that based on determinism now do clarifies the meaning of self-evident,,! Aquinas develops in q absolutely everything that anyone grasps s privacy, physical health, and can... In idealistic metaphysics direct, and Satan is to suppose that it means anthropomorphism, a at., I must disagree with Nielsens position that decision makes discourse practical the Old law, for example, takes! He comes to the first principle actually did function in this manner, all other precepts of law... Intelligibility which reason primarily prescribes as our natural inclinations of man is since!